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Unproductive Property-Apportionment on Delayed Conversion
Since the Restatement
Where a trust is created for successive beneficiaries, the interests of
the life tenants and remaindermen are by their very nature antagonistic.
The life tenant is primarily interested in the maximum income possible
whereas the remainderman is concerned only with keeping the trust corpus
intact or with increasing its value. The trustee, on the horns of this
dilemma, is faced with the problem of making the corpus productive in
line with current income returns, and, at the same time, maintaining the
original value of principal.1 Despite stringent limitations on available trust
investments it was a relatively easy matter for the trustee prior to 1929, to
make proper investments, pay a fair income to the life tenant, and, on the
termination of the trust, turn over a corpus in many cases aggregating
more than its original value.
The long era of a rising price economy, credit expansion, and acces-
sible markets has now, however, been displaced by a depressed economy
accompanied by strained market conditions. No group perhaps has been
more acutely aware of the change than the trust administrator. It has
long been the rule that a trustee is under a legal duty to sell unproductive
trust property within a reasonable time after its failure to produce a fair
income becomes apparent.2 The trustee is now faced with the thankless
task of receiving unproductive trust property from the testator, or of
having mortgage investments or other property become unproductive, and
must sell the property without sacrificing it.
Typical of the situation is this example: In 1928 testator dies leaving
an estate of $iooooo in trust to his wife for life with remainder over to
his children. The trustee invests the estate as follows: $4o,ooo in a 6 per
cent. first mortgage, $4o,ooo in federal, state, and municipal bonds averag-
ing 4 per cent., and the remaining $20,000 in the first mortgage bonds of
private corporations at an average of 4 per cent.8 From 1928 until 1932,
the estate at an average of 4% per cent. produces $466o income to the
widow. In 1932 the situation is changed. The mortgages have been
defaulted. To protect his investment the trustee has foreclosed on the
property and bought in at the sale for $iooo. Expenses of foreclosure
were $5oo. The government bonds have been retired and replaced by
others now paying 3 per cent. Values of the corporate bonds have been
cut by business failures to $io,ooo invested at 3 per cent. It will be seen
that the active principal now totals only $5oooo. At 3 per cent. the widow
receives a bare $15oo per year. Market conditions prevent the immediate
sale of the unproductive foreclosed property from 1932 until 1936 when the
property is finally sold for $40,000. In the intervening years taxes, repairs
and upkeep on the property have cost the trustee $5000 which he has paid
i. The best available treatments of these general considerations will be found in 2
ScOTT, TRUSTS (939) § 232 et seq.; 4 BOGERT, TusTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 801.
See also RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) §§ 232, 233.
2. RE-STATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § I8I (as to the general duty of the trustee to
make the trust property productive). RESTATEmENT, TRusTS (1935) § 240 (where
successive beneficiaries are involved). It will be noted that absent an equitable con-
version, New York and Massachusetts do not adopt section 240, although Massachu-
setts has liberalized its older view. See note 14 infra, and note 33 infra.
3. For the purposes of this example assume diversity of investment requirements
are met.
(831)
832 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
out of other principal. He has, however, received incidental rents for use
of the foreclosed property totaling $500 which he has paid to the widow.
A multitude of questions arise. The most immediate problems are:
(i) May the life tenant share in the ultimate proceeds of the sale?
If so to what extent? Or should the entire sum be returned to principal?
(2) Should the expenses of foreclosure and carrying charges be
advanced from principal and subjected to reimbursement on later sale, or
should the advances be subtracted from other income to the life tenant?
(3) What should the trustee do with rents?
(4) Can any intention of the settlor be deduced?
(5) What policy should guide the courts?
Prior to the depression era only isolated cases appeared.4 The matter
was left largely to the trustee's discretion. A few cases provided that some
type of apportionment of the proceeds of the delayed conversion should be
made.' In the midst of the economic debacle the Restatement of Trusts
enunciated a formula for apportionment of such proceeds 6 which has pro-
duced widespread reaction.7 The scope of this note is to consider its effi-
cacy in settlement of unproductive property problems in the light of recent
decisions, and especially to inspect defaulted mortgage situations which
have caused the greatest concern."
THE RESTATEMENT RULE
The rule for apportionment advocated by the Restatement is predi-
cated primarily on the assumption that unless the testator has specifically
provided to the contrary, he desires that the life beneficiary shall receive a
fair income. Hence it is necessary that all unproductive trust property be
sold irrespective of when it becomes unproductive.' Since in the interim
the life tenant has received no income from it, it is considered that the ulti-
mate sale proceeds contain both principal and income. In the language of
the rule " . the net proceeds from the sale are apportioned by ascer-
4. For a complete background of the cases leading to a theory of apportionment,
see Skilton, The Rights of Successive Beneficiaries in Unproductive Trust Assets Not
Bearing Interest (1941) 15 TEmP. L. Q. 241.
5. The first case in which the equitable apportionment was made in this country
apparently is Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 58r, 67 N. E. 658 (1903). See also
Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N. Y. 561, lO9 N. E. 611 (1915) ; Spencer v. Spencer, 219
N. Y. 459, 114 N. E. 849 (1917) ; Furniss v. C-ruikshank, 23o N. Y. 495, 13o N. E. 625
(1921). Apportionment in these cases was based on an intention of the testator to con-
stitute an equitable conversion.
6. RESTATEMENT, TR USTS (1935) § 241, comment e.
7. For previous treatments of.the formula and earlier case applications, see Bailey
and Rice, Duties of a Trustee With Respect to Defaulted Mortgage Investments (1935)
84 U. OF PA. L. RE;v. 157, 327, 625; Skilton, loc. cit. supra note 4. Professor Scott ex-
plains and defends the Restatement rationale. 2 ScoTT, op. cit. supra note I, §§ 241-
241.3. But see the remarks of Mr. Rose (1934) II PRo A. L. I. 306-7. Urging a
uniform application, Note (1936) 49 HAv. L. R v. 8o5; Note (i94o) 89 U. or PA. L.
Rv. io8i. The logic behind the rule has been vigorously criticized in Note (1937) 5
U. OF CHi. L. REv. 122.
Running parallel to the Restatement, compare the Uniform Principal and Income
Act, 9 U. L. A. (1942) § ii, now in force in several states.
8. It is significant that in the commercial states, especially in New York, litigation
on this latter question has increased each year.
9. "The foundational reason for this conclusion is that in nearly all instances of
long continuing trusts, the life tenants are the primary objects of the bounty of testa-
tors, and their incomes should be preserved to them, as far as it is possible to do so,
even though it may result in ultimate diminishment of principal to be paid to far-off
remaindermen. Life tenants should not be required to starve in order that remainder-
men may ultimately feast." Mr. Justice Schaeffer in Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 2), 327
Pa. 17, 173-4, 193 Atl. 30, 32 (I937), 86 U. OF PA. L. R-v. Og.
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taining the sum which with interest thereon at the current rate of return
on trust investments from the day when the duty to sell arose to the day
of the sale would equal the net proceeds. . . ." ' Simply stated, the
income to which the life fenant is entitled is the discounted value of the net
proceeds at the current trust income rate for the period of unproductivity.
Professor Scott has eased possible confusion by providing a simple
formula." If X is the permanent principal; a is the period in years elaps-
ing between the time when the duty to convert arises and the ultimate sale;
b is the current yearly return rate for trust investments; 12 and c is the
proceeds of the sale, then:
c
X+abX=c or: X=
i +ab
Thus, if the trustee possessed a piece of unproductive property for
four years and the trust return at that time was 4 per cent., and the prop-
erty was sold for a net sum of $2oooo, by application:
$20,000 20,000X ,- = - = $17,241.38 permanent principal
I+4(.04) 1.i6
and, $20,000 - 17,241.38 = $2758.62 amount allocable to income.
13
Two complications arise, most frequently in the defaulted mortgage
situation. The first is with respect to carrying charges on the property in
the period of unproductivity. As they arise the advancements are made
from other principal. On sale of the property it is manifestly inequitable
not to take such advances into consideration in apportioning the proceeds.
Accordingly the rule has been adopted that carrying charges shall be
deducted from the gross sale proceeds.' 4 The formula above is applied to
the net proceeds only.
Secondly, although the property is unproductive from a trust invest-
ment point of view, incidental sums may be derived from its use. Rents
in small amounts are typical. If the trustee retains them they are added
to the net proceeds allocable to income after the apportionment has been
made. If he has paid them out as income to the life tenant, such amounts
should be deducted from the allocable income after the apportionment has
been made.15
i0. RESTAT mET, TRUSTS (1935) § 24I (2).
ici. Id., comment e. The formula is intended to cover real and personal property.
It applies whether the property is sold at a loss or gain, whether completely unpro-
ductive or merely under-productive.
12. The Institute does not explain what is "the current yearly rate of return lor
.trust investments," how such rate is found or who finds it. Apparently each court may
make a finding to its own satisfaction.
13. For other examples, see Scorr, op. cit. supra note 1, § 241.1; 4 BOGERT, OP. cit.
supra note i, § 827.
14. Harvard Trust Co. v. Duke, 304 Mass. 414, 24 N. E. (2d) 144 (1939) (taxes
charged to principal on unproductive property) ; Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Wade, 305 Mass. 36, 24 N. E. (2d) 764 (1940) (mortgage salvage operation). It
follows that where the trustee pays carrying charges on unproductive property out of
other income instead, the life tenant is entitled to be reimbursed out of the gross pro-
ceeds of the sale before there is any apportionment. In re Reese's Estate, 173 Misc. 5io,
18 N. Y. S. (2d) 125 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
15. Unfortunately, the Restatement rule has left the matter of rent and net income
payments in the discretion of the trustee. RESTA ENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 241, com-
ment d. The effect of this discretion has been a major reason for New York's abroga-
tion of the rule. See note 53 infra. Pennsylvania has been favored by a requirement
that net rents be paid to the life tenant and that eachproperty be considered individu-
ally. Nirdinger's Estate, 331 Pa. 135, 139, 2oo Atl. 656, 657 (1938). This latter rule
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Thus in our previous hypothetical mortgage situation, the gross pro-
ceeds were $4oooo, and total expenses (taxes, foreclosure, costs, etc.)
were $65oo. A period of four calendar years elapsed from the time a duty
to sell arose. Assuming a fair return for trust investments at 4 per cent.
our answer would be:
$33,500 (i. e. $4o,ooo - 650o)X-=
I+4(.04)
33,500
X - - $28,878.45
1.i6 permanent
principal
33,500 - 28,878.45 - 4621.55
less 500.00 (rents advanced)
$4,121.55 apportioned income allocable.
PENNSYLVANIA AND TiE RULE
Pennsylvania had an almost immediate opportunity to make reference
to the apportionment theory. In Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 2)' 6 trustees
were forced to foreclose and buy in a large number of the properties. The
properties were later sold at a loss. The court held (I) that the proceeds
of the sales should be apportioned pursuant to section 241, (2) that the
life tenant was entitled to interest on monies advanced from principal to
acquire and hold the mortgaged properties for the holding period,11 (3)
that carrying charges should be deducted from principal during the period
of unproductivity and restored from the gross proceeds of the sale.18
Thus, Pennsylvania apparently adopted the Restatement rule.19 How-
ever, a year later two cases qualified its original broad adoption. In Spear's
Estate,20 the court refused to apportion between the estate of a deceased
life tenant and remaindermen. Forty-one properties were bought in on
foreclosure; other mortgages remained in default; in addition a number
represented fractional mortgage participations in the hands of the trustees.
It was asserted that (I) the right to apportionment is an equitable one
and not a vested right, (2) that practical difficulties in settling the life
is obviously more in line with the policy of aiding the life tenant to secure early in-
come. See Myer's Trust, 35 Pa. D. & C. 492 (1939).
16. 327 Pa. 171, 193 Atf. 30 (i937).
17. ". . . when these funds are taken from principal the life tenants are deprived
of income which they would receive if the funds were invested." Id, at 176, 193 At.
at 33.
i8. The pioneer Pennsylvania case adopting the views of the Restatement is Deve-
lon's Estate, 26 Pa. D. & C. ig (1936). "If the life beneficiary, by virtue of his inter-
est, is entitled to share in the fund when realized, it is but one logical and equitable step
to take the carrying charges out of principal as they accrue, instead of first taking them
out of other income and then subsequently reimbursing income out of the proceeds of
sale." Id. at 36.
19. The rule of Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 2) was clarified in two respects in a re-
appeal, 331 Pa. 135, 2oo At. 656 (1938) : (i) that net rents are to be paid to the life
tenant.- See also Myer's Trust, 35 Pa. D. & C. 492 (939) and (2) that each property
in salvage is to be treated separately in respect to such payments. See also Adamson's
Estate, 30 Pa. D. & C. 476 (1937) ; Myer's Trust, 35 Pa. D. & C. 492 (1939). For
further discussion see (1938) 36 PA. BAR Ass'x Q. 3IO; (939) 39 PA. BAR Ass'N Q.
246. See also Wissler's Estate, 31 Pa. D. & C. 89 (1937) (payment of rents ordered) ;
Cope's Trust, 38 Pa. D. & C. 327 (1940) (apportionment made where trustees accepted
a deed in lieu of foreclosure). Partial allocations before final sale, however, have been
refused: Haugh's Estate, 33 Pa. D. & C. 2o2 (1938).
20. 333 Pa. i99, 3 A. (2d) 789 (i939). While the court did not emphasize it, it
may be significant that the life tenant's interest was on spendthrift trust.
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tenant's estate and the length of time before the proceeds of all the sales
could be determined prevented the rule's application. Most significant of
all was the analogy made to a prior decision of the court wherein it was
said, "No inflexible rule can be laid down controlling the circumstances
warranting equitable apportionment." 21 And in Levy's Estate2 2 where
"decedent owned" unproductive property was sold seven years after testa-
tor's death the court refused to reverse a lower court's order which reim2
bursed the life tenant for carrying charges taken from other income on the
ground that whether carrying charges on decedent-owned property should
be paid out of principal or other income is a matter to be "determined by
considering the equities of each case. The determination of the question
is one for the exercise of a sound discretion by the court of first instance
and will be reviewed only where there has been a palpable abuse of
discretion." 23
While Levy's Estate was distinguished from Nirdlinger's Estate (No.
2) on the question of carrying charges, no reason was given by the court
for the difference of application. 24  In addition, no statement was made,
since the issue was not raised, as to apportionment of the proceeds of
decedent-owned property. It is now also doubtful to what extent the rule
of Nirdlinger's Estate will be applied (I) where the interests held by the
trustees consist of fractional mortgage participations, 25 (2) where compli-
cated accounts become stretched out over long periods of time, (3) where
final sale of the properties is impossible for a great number of years and
life tenant has received a fair income in the interim from other principal,
(4) where the life tenant has died or is not a person so closely associated
with the settlor as are the remaindermen.
21. Id. at 202, 3 A. (2d) at 79o. The mere fact that the defaulted investments in-
clude mortgage participations will not defeat application of apportionment principles,
Haugh's Estate, 33 Pa. D. & C. 2o2 (2938).
22. 333 Pa. 44o, 5 A. (2d) 98 (1939).
23. Id. at 443, 5 A. (2d) at 99. The case was remanded since the Supreme Court
was unable to ascertain the basis on which the lower court made its finding. It is sub-
mitted that the rule of reversal for abuse of discretion will not for all practical pur-
poses make any change in result in the cases. Stotesbury's Estate, 56 Montg. Co. L.
Rep. 296 (940) (over-improved property incapable of immediate sale) ; Fischer's Es-
tate, 57 Montg. Co. L. Rep. 135 (i94I).
24. Two recent lower cases are apparently out of line. In Mark's Estate, 38 Pa. D.
& C. 489 (1940), the court refused to apportion the proceeds of decedent-owned unpro-
ductive property, expressly rejecting Restatement section 241 on the ground that the
trustee was not under any duty to sell "as the will specifically provides that he (i. e.,
the trustee) shall have the power to retain any investment that decedent might leave
so long as he might deem it advisable to do so." Id. at 494. This, of course, overlooks
the legal duty imposed upon the trustee by Restatement section 24o to sell all unpro-
ductive trust property unless testator specifically directed the trustee to retain it. The
will made sale discretionary only, but did not direct retention. A possible reason for
disallowing apportionment here was the fact that the trustee did not discover the exist-
ence of the property until more than five years after testator's death.
In Pfromm's Estate, 4o Pa. D. & C. io4, iio (1940) decedent-owned unproductive
property was also involved. Carrying charges of $2,361.88 between 1924 and 1933
when the properties were sold, were advanced from other income. Sale of the proper-
ties brought only $1,250 (less expenses) or a net of $1,2I1.21. The Orphans' Court
held that the life tenant was to recoup these advances from the proceeds of the sale and
no more. This is contrary to the Restatement rule which places the burden of such
charges on principal. The disadvantage of the instant case is seen in the fact that not
only did the life tenant not receive any income on the property from 1924 until 1933,
but also bore all expenses on it until its sale for which she was only reimbursed about
5o%. No question was raised as to a possible surcharge of the trustee for keeping the
property nine years before its sale.
25. See Haugh's Estate, 33 Pa. D. & C. 202 (1938) ; Pfromm's Estate, 4o Pa. D.
& C. IO4 (194o) for lower court cases indicating that apportionment will be made.
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Although no categorical answers can be given to these questions, it
seems obvious that the cardinal principle behind all the cases is the desire
of the court to succor life tenants who are the principal objects of the tes-
tator's bounty. Where apportionment will produce an equitable result it
will probably be made whether the property is decedent-owned or later
becomes unproductive. At the same time the court desires to leave the
door open for refusal of apportionment in cases where its application will
result in more harm than good. Briefly, the rule of section 241, has been
made subservient to the equities of the particular case.
26
THE RESTATEMENT RULE IN NEW YORK
a. Unproductive Property
While New York adopted a ride of apportionment prior to the forma-
tion of the Restatement rule, 27 its application had been based on a different
rationale. As has been seen the Restatement rule is couched fundamentally
in the duty of the trustee to sell all unproductive property within a reason-
able time after it is received or becomes unproductive, in keeping with his
duty to make the estate productive. Hence there is a basis for apportion-
ment in every case of delayed sale where the testator has not specifically
provided to the contrary.
In New York no such duty has been read into the apportionment
cases. 28  Instead the key to all apportionment in cases of unproductive
property is in construction of an expressed intention on the part of the
testator from the words of the instrument. Where the will authorizes the
trustee to sell absolutely, an equitable conversion has been held to arise.29
From this it is presumed that he intended the life tenant to receive income
from the property after its sale and reinvestment. Therefore, if the con-
version is delayed a part of the proceeds are considered income and the
apportionment is made.
So long as a mandatory direction of the testator is found no difficulty
ensues. However, where testator's will authorizes the trustee to sell in his
discretion, or if he deems it advisable, or in the exercise of his judgment,
the fiction becomes more evident.80 The New York courts, nevertheless,
have construed language to this effect to mean that the power to sell was
really mandatory, and discretionary only as to the time of the sale.31 It is
26. Levy's Estate, 333 Pa. 440, 5 A. (2d) 98 (1939).
27. Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N. Y. 56i, iog N. E. 61I (1915); Spencer v.
Spencer, 219 N. Y. 459, 114 N. E. 849 (1917); Furniss v. Cruiltihank, 23o N. Y. 495,
13o N. E. 625 (1921). The origin of the New York rule is evidently in Edwards v.
Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 N. E. 658 (1903) (which in turn was based on a number
of English cases). The history is reviewed in Lawrence v. Littlefield, supra.
28. For example, see In re Satterwhite, 262 N. Y. 339, 186 N. E. 857 (1933).
Equitable conversion not found where the will indicated that testator intended the life
tenant to use a property as a residence, tenant refused to use it, and trustee did not rent,
even though the property was unproductive. This is also the rule in Illinois, Love v.
Engelke, 368 Ill. 342, 14 N. E. (2d) 288 (1938).
29. In re Satterwhite, 262 N. Y. 339, 186 N. E. 857 (1933) (where trustee was
directed to sell part of testator's property three years after his death).
3o. Lawrence v.- Littlefield, 215 N. Y. 561, io9 N. E. 6i1 (1915); Spencer v.
Spencer, 219 N. Y. 459, 114 N. E. 849 (1917). "'When the relation was one of wife or
daughter, or one in similar close relationship, it is held . . . there should be apportion-
ment. . . . To that end it will be held a power of sale will be considered mandatory,
that equitable conversion may occur, unless the language used shows a clear intent to
the contrary. . . . There can be no certainty that the result is correct. At best it is
an attempt to do justice between conflicting interests." Matter of Lott, 251 App. Div.
333, 335, 296 N. Y. Supp. 43, 45-46 (2d Dept. 1937).
31. See note 3o supra.
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not clear from these cases when the equitable conversion can be said to
take place.82
The greatest difficulty has naturally been found in effecting an equi-
table conversion- where the property has become unproductive subsequent
to the death of the testator.83 Here, obviously, testator could not have
expressed any particular intent. In Matter of Rowland 8 4 an equitable
conversion was still found from a discretionary power of sale as of the
date on which the property subsequently became unproductive. In that
case testator owned certain realty as a tenant in common with others. The
property was leased to a business corporation. By his will testator gave
the property in trust to his wife for her life, with remainder to such per-
sons as would be his heirs under the laws of New York. A year after
his death, the lessee-corporation dissolved and the lease was surrendered.
While recognizing the trend toward an absolute duty to sell all unproduc-
tive property,3 5 the court refused to adopt the Restatement rule in that
particular. Having found an equitable conversion, the Court of Appeals
applied the Restatement formula as to disposition of carrying charges on
the property and apportioned the proceeds of sale.
If no intent of the testator can be deduced upon which to base an
equitable conversion, a fortiori, no apportionment will be made irrespective
of the fact that the life tenant is within the realm of a testator's natural
bounty.88  It is in this respect that the application of the New York rule
has been most strongly criticized.8 7 In practice, however, the ease with
which an equitable conversion is found largely compensates for the seem-
ingly fictional rule.88
Apportionment itself has been extended farther in New York than in
most states to include unproductive personal property whether tangible89
or intangible.
40
Like Pennsylvania, New York has recognized that since apportionment
is primarily of an equitable nature, its use should be limited to those cases
where (i) the life tenant is a natural object of the testator's bounty and
32. Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N. Y. 561, iog N. E. 611 (1915) (testator's death) ;
Furniss v. Cruikshank, 23o N. Y. 495, 13o N. E. 625 (1921) (one year after death).
See It re Andreini's Estate, I65 Misc. 297, 300, 3oo N. Y. Supp. 1224, 1229 (Surr. Ct.
1937).
33. Matter of Rowland, 272 N. Y. ioo, 6 N. E. (2d) 393 (1937) ; In re Reese, 173
Misc. 51o, 18 N. Y. S. (2d) 125 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
34. 273 N. Y. Ioo, 6 N. E. (2d) 393 (1937).
35. Id. at io8, 6 N. E. (2d) at 396.
36. See note 28 supra.
37. See Skilton, op. cit. supra note 4. Note (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 275.
38. ". . . a more liberal rule has prevailed in construing the intent of the tes-
tator where a considerable part of the trust estate consists of unproductive real prop-
erty and the beneficiary entitled to the income is one in close relationship to the testator
and was the natural object of his bounty. Paricularly is that rule applied where the
testator must have known that without such construction the beneficiary would be left
without adequate support. . . ." Matter of Lott, 251 App. Div. 333, 335, 296 N. Y.
Supp. 43, 45 (2d Dept. 1937).
39. Where an estate consisted of assets totaling $i,Soo,ooo of which $i,ooo,ooo rep-
resented a collection of paintings the proceds of their ultimate sale were apportioned.
Matter of Clarke, 166 Misc. 807, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 6D (Surr. Ct. 1938).
40. In re Hovelaque, 176 Misc. 869, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 200 (Surr. Ct. I941) ; I re
Kight, 167 Misc. 296, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 63 (Surr. Ct. 1938) (dividends on frozen bank
deposits). An interesting decision, the latest statement of the Court of Appeals is Mat-
ter of Pennoel 285 N. Y. 475, 35 N. E. (2d) 177 (1941) : The sole assets of the estate
were testator's rights to the commissions on renewal premiums of policies sold by him
during his lifetime, but payable after his death. Apportionment of the commissions was
made between the widow as life tenant and remaindermen.
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(2) a substantial part of the trust corpus is unproductive so as materially
to deprive the life tenant of needed income.
41
b. Salvage Operations
The history of apportionment in salvage operations in New York has
been an unhappy one. It has been seen that under the Restatement rule
an apportionment is made at the current trust return rate in the same
manner as any other type of unproductive property. 2 In New York a
somewhat different apportionment idea crystallized in the so-called Chapal-
Otis rule. In re Chapal43 decided that the proceeds of a sale of unpro-
ductive realty acquired by testamentary trustees through mortgage fore-
closures in which trust funds had been invested, should be apportioned
between principal and income after costs of foreclosure and carrying
charges advanced from other principal were repaid. In re Otis4 4 com-
pleted the picture by stating that the apportionment should be made at
the same rate of interest the defaulted mortgages carried at the time of
their default. This rate was applied both for the period from default until
foreclosure, and in the case where the trustee was forced to buy in at the
sale, for the period between foreclosure and ultimate sale to a third
person.
45
While apportionment was refused in a number of cases 46 and the
Court of Appeals evinced the statement that, "a general rule for such situa-
tions cannot be attained at a bound . . . and must in the end be shaped
by considerations of business policy", 47 the general doctrine became well
entrenched.4  It was extended beyond the Pennsylvania application to
41. Apportionment is allowed generally where the property has a material amount
of unproductivity: Matter of Pennock, 285 N. Y. 475,35 N. E. (2d) 177 (1941) (009) ;
Matter of Clarke, 166 Misc. 807, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 6o (Surr. Ct. 1938) (55%) ; Matter
of Lott, 251 App. Div. 333, 296 N. Y. Supp. 43 (2d Dept. 1937) (409) ; Matter of
Jackson, 258 N. Y. 281, 179 N. E. 496 (1932) (36%) ; Furniss v. Cruikshank, 23o N.
Y. 495, 13o N. E. 625 (1921) (77%) ; Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215 N. Y. 561, 1O9 N. E.
6II (1915).
Apportionment was refused: Ip re Andreini's Will, 165 Misc. 297, 3o0 N. Y. Supp.
224 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; Ip re Satterwhite's Will, 262 N. Y. 339, 186 N. E. 857 (1933)
(2o%) ; It re Marshall, 136 Misc. 116, 238 N. Y. Supp. 763 (Surr. Ct. 193o) (596).
Apportionment will be refused where the property has not yet been sold or is only
partially sold: In re Easton, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 295 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Matter of Win-
throp, 168 Misc. 861, 6 N. Y. S. 539 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
Apportionment has, however, been allowed even though the life tenant has died be-
fore sale of the unproductive property; In re McManus, 282 N. Y. 420, 26 N. E. (2d)
96o (194o). See 2 Scowt, op. cit. supra note I, § 241.6. Cf. Spear's Estate, 333 Pa. 199,
3 A. (2d) 789 (1939).
42. See REsTATEMENT, TRusTs (935) § 241, comment b.
43. 269 N. Y. 464, 199 N. E. 762 (1936).
44. 276 N. Y. IOI, ii N. E. (2d) 556 (1937).
45. Logically, the mortgage rate should be the measure from the time of default
until foreclosure and the trust investment rate the measure from that time until sale.
See 2 Scorr, op. cit. sz pra note I, § 241.3. See Ip re Otis, 158 Misc. 808, 287 N. Y. S.
758 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; In re Manger, 165 Misc. 254, 300 N. Y. Supp. 878 (Surr. Ct.
1937).
46. See, for example: In re Eagle, I69 Misc. 140, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) 173 (Surr. Ct.
1938), where the court said the Chapal rule should apply only to true mortgage invest-
ments and not to participating mortgage certificates.
The salvage rule is criticized in Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 913, 937, 285 N. Y.
Supp. 723, 748 (1936).
47. In re Otis, 276 N. Y. IOI, 15, II N. E. (2d) 556, 559 0937).
48. Cases using the 6% mortgage rate are: it, re Wilson, 167 Misc. 758, 4 N. Y.
S. (2d) 634 (1938) ; In re Martin, 165 Misc. 597, I N. Y. S. (2d) 8o (Surr. Ct. 1938);
cf. In re Phelps, 162 Misc. 703, 295 N. Y. Supp. 840 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
Where 'the proceeds of the sale consist partly of cash and partly of a purchase money
mortgage both are apportioned: In re Manger, 165 Misc. 254, 300 N. Y. Supp. 878
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allow allocation in a proper salvage operation between the estate of a
deceased life tenant and remaindermen " on the theory that the years of
unproductivity between default and ultimate sale had deprived the life
tenant of income which he would ordinarily have accumulated to his estate.
Apportionment was made where, in lieu of foreclosure, the trustee accepted
a deed of the premises and later sold the property to the remaindermen.5O
In its inception the New York rule like that of the Restatement was
based on the equitable theory of protecting the life tenant, as the primary
object of the testator's bounty. Unfortunately, as is true of many equitable
principles, the rule is primarily premised on the ideal situation. Success in
apportionment depends on (i) the sale of the property within some reason-
able period after foreclosure, (2) a market in that time, and (3) simplified
application of the rule.
In the flood of litigation which has swept New York since 1936 in
regard to salvage problems, three overwhelming difficulties have arisen. In
the first place no market was present for sale until periods long after fore-
closure.5 1 Secondly, the heavy lists of varied mortgages, fractional inter-
ests, all in various stages of salvage coupled with high carrying charges
and costs produced complicated accounts at which accountants, trustees,
and courts were at variance.52  Thirdly, and most important of all, has
been the disposition of current income. In the Otis case 53 a discretionary
power was given the trustee during a mortgage salvage operation to disburse
rents or other income from the property after advances made from prin-
cipal had been repaired. Numerous cases have illustrated, however, that
the trustee through fear of overpayment and surcharge has hesitated to
advance such income.54 Thus, ironically enough, "the object of the testa-
tor's bounty" has suffered under a rule originally designed to protect him.
(Surr. Ct. 1937) ; but where the proceeds consist of insufficient cash to reimburse prin-cipal for advances, plus a purchase money mortgage, all of the cash went to principaland the mortgage was apportioned: It, re Martin, 165 Misc. 597, 1 N. Y. Supp. 8o
(Surr. Ct. 1937).
Carrying charges advanced from principal should be reimbursed to corpus firstfrom the gross proceeds of sale: In re Egger, 167 Misc. 66, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 474 (Surr.
Ct. 1938) ; In re Brainerd, 169 Misc. 640, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 413 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; It re
Schepp, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 112 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
Each salvage operation is to be treated separately: In re Brainerd, 169 Misc. 64o,8 N. Y. S. (2d) 413 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; In re Schepp, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 112 (Surr. Ct.
1938).
49. It re McManus, 282 N. Y. 42o, 26 N. E. (2d) 96o (1940).5o. It re Scott, i68 Misc. 531, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) i8o (Surr. Ct. 1938); It re Schepp,
9 N. Y. S. (2d) 112 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
5I. For example, It re Martin's Estate, 165 Misc. 597, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 8o (937):a period of 21 years elapsed before final allocation could be made. On each foreclosure
and sale the trustees were forced by circumstances to accept purchase money mortgages
in partial payment. These were also defaulted and foreclosed. Salvage operations be-gan anew. The case involved one of the most complicated accountings of all time. In
another case, seven mortgages were in process of salvage, the longest period being oversix years, and the average length of time about five years. In re West, 175 Misc. 1O44,
26 N. Y. S. (2d) 622 (Surr. Ct. 194).
52. A cursory study of the decision in It re Pelcyger's Estate, 157 Misc. 917, 285N. Y. Supp. 723 (Surr. Ct. 1936), in which more than fifty separate items were argued,will illustrate the uncertainty which exists. Again the number of errors made by thetrustees in their accounts in In re Martin, 165 Misc. 597, I N. Y. S. (2d) 8o (Surr. Ct.
1937) reveals the difficulties of application.
53. See note 44 supra. Rehearing was denied in 277 N. Y. 650, 14 N. E. (2d) 203(1938), where the court said, "We think our opinion in Matter of Otis does not imply
that fiduciaries may distribute surplus income before all advances from principal are
repaid."
54. The best discussion of the irony of this rule is found in Matter of West, 175Misc. 1044, 1049, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 622, 629 (Surr. Ct. 1941). The rule of discretion
was followed in: It re Phelps, 162 Misc. 703, 295 N. Y. Supp. 84o (Surr. Ct. 1938) ;
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To alleviate this situation the New York legislafure in 194o passed a
statute 5 5 completely abrogating the apportionment method.58  It is a step
of sweeping potentialities. The effect of the act is twofold:
In re Martin, i65 Misc. 597, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 8o (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; In re Manger, 165
Misc. 2544 3oo N. Y. Supp. 878 (Surr. Ct. 1937) ; In re Crimmins, i59 Misc. 499, 288
N. Y. Supp. 552 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
The trustee was surcharged for violation of his discretion in paying surplus rents
in In re Egger, 167 Misc. 66, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 474 (Surr. Ct. 1938) ; In re Brainerd,
169 Misc. 64o, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 413 (Surr. Ct. 1938). In the latter case the court said,
"The limits of the discretion of a trustee to pay current net income to a life beneficiary
after all salvage advances have been repaid, have not thus far been made the subject of
any judicial decision with which the court is familiar. The subject is, however, one
which trustees may well ponder with care to the end that they may not be involved in
possible future difficulties by a too liberal exercise of discretionary authority." Id. at
644, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) at 417.
55. "Section 17-c: (i) Unless otherwise expressly provided in a will, deed of trust
or other instrument, in any case in which an executor or a trustee under a will or deed
of trust or other instrument shall hold a mortgage upon real property for the benefit of
one or more tenants for life or limited term, with remainder over, and such executor or
trustee shall acquire title to such real property by foreclosure or conveyance in. lieu of
foreclosure, sucz acquired real property shall be and become a principal asset in lieu of
such mortgage. Such tenant or tenants for life or limited term shall be entitled to the
net income from such acquired real property from the date of its acquisition.
After the date of the taking effect of this section, no allocation or apportionment
as between life tenant and remainderman, of the proceeds of the sale of the real prop-
erty previously subject to a mortgage shall be made. The rules of procedure now or
heretofore applicable to such allocations or apportionments of the proceeds of sale are
hereby abolished.
The expenses of foreclosure or of conveyance in lieu of foreclosure and the arrears
of taxes and other liens which accrued prior to such foreclosure or conveyance shall be
charges payable out of principal. Where any moneys have been advanced out of income
to pay such expenses, taxes or other liens, they shall be reimbursed to income out of
principal.
The terms and rules of procedure of this subdivision shall apply only to the estate
of persons dying after its enactment and to trusts created under a deed of trust or other
instrument executed after its enactnent and to investments of mortgages hereafter made
by a trustee of an existing trust whether testamentary or inter vivos.
(2) The existing rules of procedure applying to salvage operations respecting
existing mortgage investments are continued except as modified by the subparagraphs
hereinafter set forth. The terms and rules of procedure of this subdivision shall apply
specifically (a) to the estates of persons dying before its enactment, and (b) to mort-
gages on real property held by a trustee under a deed of trust or other instrument
executed before the date of its enactment, and (c) to real property acquired by fore-
closure of mortgage or real property acquired in lieu of foreclosure before or after the
date of its enactment in trusts created or mortgage investments made prior thereto, and
(d) to any pending proceedings or action for an accounting of the transactions of an
executor or trustee.
(a) Net income during the salvage operation. up to three per centum upon the prin-
cipal amount of the inortgage shall be paid to the life tqnant, regardless of prinipal ad-
vances for the expenses of foreclosure or of conveyance in lieu of foreclosure and arrears
of taxes and other liens which occurred prior to such foreclosure or conveyance and the
cost of all capital improvements. Any payment of net income heretofore or hereafter
made to the life tenant up to such three per centum shall be final and shall not be sub-
ject to recoupment from the life tenant or as a surcharge against the trustee or executor.
The amount of all such payments shall be taken into account, however, in the appor-
tionment of the proceeds of sale and shall be charged against the share of the life tenant.
(b) The foregoing principal advances shall be repaid out of excess net income
above such three per centum per annum.' When the principal advances have been satis-
fied, any excess net income shall be impounded (subject to reinvestment under the terms
of the will or deed) to await sale and apportionment.
(c) The unpaid principal advances shall be a primary lien upon the proceeds of
sale and shall be paid first out of any cash so derived. If insufficient the balance shall
be a primary lien upon any purchase money mortgage received upon the sale.
(d) The purpose of the enactment of this subdivision is declared to be the simplifi-
cation of the rules of procedure in mortgage salvage operations and the elimination of
present complications which work to the disadvantage of the life tenant, who is usually
the principal object of the testator's or settlor's bounty, by depriving him of a fixed
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(I) The first section abolishes the cumbersome Chapal-Otis rule
entirely as to all trusts or mortgage investments after the effective date of
the act. In its place, the foreclosed mortgage becomes a principal asset
of the estate. Any net income from the property is payable to the life
tenant immediately. Expenses of foreclosure, taxes, and costs are charged
out of other principal.
(2) Section two provides that in all cases so long as the Chapal-Otis
rule applies, net income up to three per cent. per annum is to be paid auto-
matically to the life tenant, and no trustee will be surcharged for such pay-
ments. Carrying charges, costs of foreclosure, and taxes will be paid from
income in excess of 3 per cent., if any, or from other principal. Advances
from principal for such expenses become a lien on the proceeds of the
sale at the completion of the salvage operation, when the apportionment
rule is applied. In the final allocation, payments to the life tenant are
charged against his share of the proceeds of sale.
The immediate advantages of the second section of the act are appar-
ent. Satisfaction has already been expressed at tangible results.5 7 The
meaning of the abolition of apportionment as prescribed for future trusts
is also cleAr. Where the foreclosed property brings in a measure of rev-
enue from rents the life tenant will benefit at once without the lapse of
many years as was formerly true. Expenses deductible from principal
reduce other income to the tenant, but at the same time place the burden
where the loss is least felt. On the other hand, where no income is real-
ized from the property, the tenant will receive none. Apparently the legis-
lature has been motivated by two factors exclusive of its desire to relieve
complicated administration. First, that most mortgage investments are
secured by improved property in the form of homes, apartments, or office
buildings capable of producing some revenue even in depression periods.
Secondly, that in the minority of cases, where no income is realized during
the entire salvage period, it is productive of less uncertainty to have a defi-
nite rule of procedure guiding the activities of trustees, accountants, and
courts.
CONCLUSION
In the few short years in which the apportionment theory of the
Restatement has been in effect it has functioned remarkably well in the
ordinary case of unproductive property. Where salvage operations are in
question, however, the task has, at best, been a difficult one. Even in
states not faced with the volume of extreme cases which prompted the
alteration of the New York rule, the courts have been hesitant about mak-
right to the actual payment of any net income earned by the property. Such fixed right
is granted in lieu of the discretion now given to the trustee to pay net income or any
part thereof to the life tenant. The general rules of the apportionment of the proceeds
of sale between life tenant and remainderman are retained subject to the express modi-
fications made herein. Only equitable adjustments and balances are intended to be
effectuated by this subdivision ...
(3) The term 'mortgage' as used herein shall include a mortgage particpation or
a mortgage certificate or any other form of interest in a whole mortgage, but shall not
include a mortgage participation or a mortgage certificate or any other form of interest
in a group of mortgages. (Effective April 13, 194o.)" N. Y. PERs. PROP. LAW, Art.
2, § 17-c (Cahill, Supp. 1940).
56. Compare: CoNN. GEm. STATS. § 1291 (e) (Supp. 1939).
57. "From the time of the passage of the new act, it has been the practical experi-
ence and observation of the surrogates that hundreds of thousands of dollars which had
been theretofore accumulated, were paid out to life tenants upon the authority granted
by the statute." I re West, 175 Misc. lO44, 1O49, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 62a, 629 (Surr. Ct.
1941).
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ing application of the rule complete. Pennsylvania has left open the way
to reject it. The abrupt change in New York perhaps foreshadows a gen-
eral return to the original view in the best interests of the life tenant. It
is agreed that the depression era has made the situation of the tenant
acute, and that since he is the primary object of the bounty of the deceased,
the only end to be gained is relief of his position. Both the Restatement
and the New York rule purport to be a means to that end. If the Restate-
ment fails to provide a measure of income to him for long periods of time
before the properties are sold, coupled with increased difficulty of admin-
istration, then the rule has failed to achieve its desired result. If the New
York premise that income will be realized in the great majority of cases,
is illustrated by a marked relief to life beneficiaries, then it will have proved
its efficacy. 58
W. N. C.
Interstate Commerce and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938
Campaigning for federal regulation of wages and hours has been char-
acteristic of the New Deal. In view of this attitude, although the first
attempts met with dismal failure,' the promulgation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 2 came as no surprise. The object of the FLSA is
to overcome sweatshop conditions 8 by enforcing for labor a living wage 4
with extra time for overtime.5 Until the Supreme Court has spoken, no final
delineation can be made, but a review of the FLSA as it is being interpreted
by the courts, both federal and state,6 may be helpful in solving the problem
of the scope of its application.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.
The FLSA, in its broad aspects, was held constitutional by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Darby; 7 the Court held it to be within the com-
merce power,8 consistent with the Tenth Amendment, and no violation of
58. The application of the new act has been discussed in only three cases at this
writing: In re West, note 57 supra; In re Douglas, 176 Misc. 24, 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 387
(Surr. Ct. 1941) ; In re Van Nostrand, 177 Misc. I, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 857 (Surr. Ct.
1941).
i. The N. I. R. A., 48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §7oi et seq. (1928), held
invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority in A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (I935), was replete with wage and hour
regulations. See DeVyer, Regulation of Wages and Hours Prior to 1938 (1939) 6
LAw & CoNTEmP. PROR. 323, 330, 33I; Note (133) 47 HAv. L. REv. 85, 86.
2. 52 STAT. io6o, 29 U. S. C. A. § 201 et seq. (Supp. 1941).
3. See Note (1939) 52 HAmv. L. Ray. 646. The motivating principles of the Act
are set forth in § 202. See Note (1939) 39 COL. L. Rnv. 818, 819.
4. J 206 provides for a minimum wage of 25 cents an hour when it takes effect,
ranging to 40 cents an hour seven years from the effective date.
5. § 206 provides for time and a half for overtime. See Cooper, "Extra Time for
Overtime" Now Law (1938) 37 MicH. L. REv. 28.
6. § 216 (b) gives federal and state courts concurrent jurisdiction under the Act.
Accord: Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 32 F. Supp. 1g (E. D. Tenn. 1941), rev'd
on other grounds, 121 F. (2d) 285 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941).
7. 312 U. S. 100 (1941). Although Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918),
holding Congressional regulation of child labor not to be within the power of Congress,
stood squarely across the path of the constitutionality of the Act, that decision, consid-
erably weakened by Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197 (1938),
(1939) 7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1030, was, for all practical purposes, completely emascu-
lated in the Darby case. Supra at 116.
8. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The commerce power is
the basis of the Act, for by its terms it applies only to those "engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce".9 An employee is
deemed "engaged in the production of goods for commerce" if employed
"in any . . occupation necessary to the production" of such goods.10 The
Darby decision, however, was general in its language and gave little indi-
cation of where, under the act, the boundaries of the commerce power lie.
It is to be noted that although Congress may not regulate business which
is strictly intrastate, it has the power to legislate as to transactions which,
when isolated, are purely intrastate, yet which bear such a close and sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce as to be a part of it.1 From the
language of the Act the framers were not desirous of using this power of
Congress to its full extent. An example of its fuller application is the
National Labor Relations Act 12 which extends federal control under it to
any transaction affecting commerce. 13 However, decisions under the NLRA
carry little weight as precedent for interpretation of the FLSA,'14 though
some courts have attempted to so use these decisions.
Another factor considered by a number of courts is the nature of the
Act. The majority approach seems to be to refer to the "preamble", or
statement of purpose,1 5 and hold the Act remedial and therefore entitled to
liberal construction, 6 thus extending its benefits to as many employees as
possible. This seems to be the correct approach if the purpose of the
decision is the minimum wage, for $40 a month (the minimum under the
Act 17) is a "bare subsistence". 8  But in many cases the purpose of the
litigation is to collect extra pay for overtime, the total monthly wage being
far in excess of the statutory minimum. It is true that there is public inter-
est in having a man receive extra compensation for long hours of labor, and
in preventing an employer from gaining an unfair advantage over his com-
petitors in the same industry who adhere to shorter hours. Yet the argu-
ment for overtime, the base pay being high, is not so compelling as that for
a living wage, and it may be advisable to interpret the Act strictly when
applying it in such a situation. Other courts consider the provisions in the
Act for penalties for evasion and liquidated damages for wilful violation.' 9
Some have considered "liquidated damages" as merely a label for a penalty,
9. § 207 (a).
10. §203(j).
ri. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. IoO, II8, 119, 120 (1941).
12. 49 STAT. 449 (i935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 15r et seq. (Supp. ig4i).
13. 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 152(7), I59(c). See N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 3Ol U. S. 1, 32 (1937). The distinction between the two Acts has been recog-
nized in the cases under the FLSA. See Fleming v. Arsenal Building Corp., 38 F.
Supp. 207, 211, 212 (S. D. N. Y. 194). It is there pointed out that the legislative his-
tory of the Act bears out this distinction. But see Fleming v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., 114 F. (2d) 384, 390 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940). For a detailed discussion of the legis-
lative history of the FLSA, see Cooper, The Coverage of the Fair Labor Standards
Act and Other Problems in Its Interpretation (1939) 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 333.
14. In F. T. C. v. Bunte Bros., 312 U. S. 349, 353 (1941) Mr. Justice Frankfurter
said, "Translation of an implication drawn from the special aspects of one statute to a
totally different statute is treacherous business."
I5. § 202 states the purpose of the Act. In Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410, 427
(1898) it was held that the preamble of an act may properly be referred to in ascer-
taining the intent and meaning of a statute susceptible of different constructions.
16. See Bowie v. Gonzales, 117 F. (2d) 11, 16 (C. C. A. xst, 1941); Fleming Y.
Hawkeye Pearl Button Co., 113 F. (2d) 52, 56 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941).
17. See note 4 supra.
18. Jacobs v. Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co., 33 F. Supp. 206, 211 (W. D. La. i94o).
19. § 216.
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and have thus treated the Act as penal and deserving strict construction.
20
In a close case these factors must all be considered and should bear some
weight in its determination, but the better approach is to look at the purpose
of the litigation and then decide whether, for this purpose, the statute is
remedial or penal, and no blanket decision as to the nature of the Act for
all purposes should be made.
One further factor to be considered is the interpretive bulletins issued
by the Administrator. The object of these is to allow an employer to be
able to tell in advance whether or not his particular employees are subject
to the terms of the Act. Some courts, although admitting that these bul-
letins are not binding on them, have given them such weight as to make
them almost prina facie evidence."- It is submitted that interpretive
bulletins should be discarded by the courts. Their purpose is merely to
forewarn the employer and not to influence judicial decision. The statute
must be construed in accordance with the intent of the legislature as
expressed in the language of the Act as a whole, and the wishes of its
proponents should carry little if any weight.
ENGAGED IN COMMERCE
The FLSA embraces employees "engaged in commerce".22 Commerce
is defined as "trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among
the several States or from any State to any place outside thereof".28 It is
difficult to tell from this whether it is to be broadly interpreted or strictly
limited to the words quoted; defining a word in terms of itself can be of
little assistance to the courts in determining whether a specific activity con-
stitutes commerce. Although the employee, as agent of the employer,
cannot be engaged in commerce unless his employer is, the Act stresses that
it is the work of the employee that is to be determinative.24 A complaint
is insufficient when it merely states that the employer is engaged in inter-
state commerce, without reference to whether or not the employee bringing
the suit is so engaged.25 While some courts have held that if the employer
was engaged at all in interstate commerce, then all his employees must
come under the Act,28 the view more in accord with the intent of the Act
is that expressed by Senator Pepper in the Senate discussion, "I want it
20. See Thompson -v. Daugherty, 4o F. Supp. 279, 284 (D. Md. 1941) ; Abroe v.
Lindsay Bros., 4 WAGE & HouR REP. 38 (1941) ; cf. Brown v. Carter Drilling Co., 38F.
Supp. 489, 492 (S. D. Tex. 1941). But see Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121 F.
(2d) 285, 286 (C. C. A. 6th, 1941) ; La Guardia v. Austin Bliss General Tire Co., 41
F. Supp. 678, 68o (S. D. N. Y. 1941). Probably the most sensible approach is that of
Collins v. Kidd, 38 F. Supp. 634, 637 (E. D. Tex. 1941), where it is stated that if a
statute is "penal in one part and remedial in the other, it should be considered as a penal
statute when it is sought to enforce the penalty, and as a remedial statute when it is
sought to enforce the remedy".
21. See Gordon v. Paducah Ice Mfg. Co., 41 F. Supp. 980, 987 (W. D. Ky. 1941);
Travis v. Ray, 4 WAGE & HOUR REP. 580, 581 (W. D. Ky. 1941) ; Graves v. Arm-
strong Creamery Co., 118 P. (2d) 613, 614 (Sup. Ct. Kan. 1941). But see Fleming v.
Stone, 41 F. Supp. iooo, loO5 (N. D. Ill. 1941).
22. §§ 2o6(a), 207(a).
23. § 203 (b).
24. Gates v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 31 F. Supp. 854 (D. Neb. 1940). See Flem-
ing. v. Goldblatt, 39 F. Supp. 701, 703 (N. D. Ill. 1941) ; Gerdert v. Certified Poultry
& Egg Co., 38 F. Supp. 964, 967 (S. D. Fla. 1941). This approach is novel in that
similar statutes have stressed the business of the employer. See Note (1939) 52 HIv.
L. Rxv. 646, 650.
25. Corbett v. Schlumberger Surveying Corp., 5 WAGE & HOUm REP. 219 (S. D.
Tex. 1942); Baggett v. Henry Fischer Packing Co., 37 F. Supp. 67o (W. D. Ky.
1941) ; Gates v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 31 F. Supp. 854 (D. Neb. 1940).
26. Crompton v. Baker, 4 Lab. Cas. 6o, 692 (N. C. Sup. Ct. 1941) ; Lewis v. Nail-
ling, 36 F. Supp. 187 (W. D. Tenn. 194o).
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distinctly stated that this proposed law is not applicable to all employees
of an industry which itself is engaged in interstate commerce. It is appli-
cable only to those employees who themselves are engaged either in inter-
state commerce or the production of goods for interstate commerce, and
the contrary theory was definitely rejected by the committee." 27 From
this it is apparent that the greater part of the business of an employer may
be in interstate commerce, but if a particular employee is engaged in part
of the business which is entirely intrastate, then the employee is not subject
to the Act.
28
In spite of the clear language of the Act, several courts have failed to
apply this distinction. In Pederson v. Fitzgerald Construction Co.29 defend-
ant, an independent contractor, was engaged in repairing abutments for
bridges for an interstate railroad. Defendant's employees were denied relief
under the Act, the court holding the work local in character and separate
from the interstate commerce in which the railroad was engaged. 0 Had
the complaining workmen been employed by the railroad, doubtless there
would have been no question as to the interstate nature of the work per-
formed and the Act would have applied. There is no logical reason why
the mere fact that their employer was an independent contractor should bar
them from the benefits of the Act.81 To allow this would encourage com-
panies to hire independent contractors at every opportunity and thus defeat
the purpose of the Act. In another case 82 the defendant employer ran a
night watchman service which it was conceded was not in interstate com-
merce. But one of his employees ivas sent to watch a national bank which
was engaged in interstate commerce. In denying the employee relief under
the Act, the court said, "His employer is not engaged in producing goods
for interstate commerce. He (the employer) ought not to be subjected to
the pains and penalties of the statute." 83 Perhaps the reason for the latter
decision may be found in the desire of the court to prevent great confusion,
intricate bookkeeping, and much litigation of suits by dissatisfied employees,
if the sarrie employee is to be subject to the Act at certain times and not
subject to it at others. This consideration, however, seems to be far out-
weighed by the value of the Act to the community. These are problems to
be handled by the individual employer who should be able to deal with them
upon realization that he is subject to the Act.
Another problem in regard to the "in commerce" provision of the
FLSA arises from the fact that A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
27. 83 CONG. REc. 9168 (1938). Accord: Jax Beer Co. v. Redfern, 124 F. (2d)
172 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, 118 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. ioth,
1941) ; Fleming v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 701 (N. D. Ill. ig4i).
28. Swift & Co. v. Wilkerson, 124 F. (2d) 176 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941); Muldowney
v. Seaberg Elevator Co., 39 F. Supp. 275 (E. D. N. Y. 194); Baggett v. Henry
Fisher Packing Co., 37 F. Supp. 670 (W. D. Ky. 1941) ; Jehys v. Singer Sewing Ma-
chine Co., 4 WAGE & Houi REa. 6oi (N. D. Okla. 194i) ; see Foster v. National Bis-
cuit Co., 31 F. Supp. 552-553 (W. D. Wash. 194o).
29. 3o N. Y. S. (2d) 989 (App. Div., 3d Dept. 1941).
30. Ibid. The dissent properly points out that the work was "so closely related to
the interstate commerce in which the structures were already being used as to be a part
of it."
3I. The court states most inconclusively and illogically that "Interstate commerce
means interstate commercial intercourse, and while defendant, pursuant to its contract,
was engaged in work on an instrumentality of interstate commerce, the performance
of such work does not constitute such commerce." Id. at 991.
32. Farr v. Smith Detective Agency & Night Watch Service, 38 F. Supp. 105 (N.
D. Tex. 1941). This involves the special case of a watchman, which will be dealt with
later, but the general principles of the case are applicable to this situation. Accord:
Bowman v. Pace Co., nig F. (2d) 858 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
33. Id. at io6.
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States3 ' is apparently still law. This case is authority for holding that
goods flowing into a state lose their interstate character if they come to rest
in a warehouse from whence their only movement is to retailers within the
same state. The warehouse employees who distribute the goods locally are
not subject to the Act. 5 Here again it is the work of the employee that
must be considered, for some of the employees may be subject to the Act.
The warehouse is the place where the interstate relation of the goods ceases,
so one handling them prior to this time-for instance, unloading goods from
freight cars-is engaged in interstate commerce.3 In view of the recent
trend toward liberality of application of statutes founded on the commerce
clause, the Sckechter decision seems unfortunate. Perhaps the more sensible
approach to the problem is that of Fleming v. Alterman - in which the
court held that the wholesaler was not removed from commerce simply
because he did not take part in shipping the goods to another state. The
court said, "The proposition that antecedent acts may engage one in com-
merce as well as subsequent acts would appear to be supported by authority
and certainly is soud in reason." Il This seems to be the more reasonable
view, but unfortunately is contrary to the weight of authority. It is to be
hoped that in the future courts will refuse to recognize such an arbitrary
point as the stopping place of interstate commerce and hold that the whole-
saler is a part of the "flow of commerce". The Act itself recognizes that
it is the retailer who is the stopping point in interstate commerce 3 9 Merely
because the wholesaler keeps the goods in his warehouse for a period of
time certainly should not make him any less an instrumentality of commerce
than the interstate shipper who keeps them a few weeks before shipping 4 0
PRODUCTION OF GOODS FOR COMMERCE
The FLSA also includes employees engaged "in the production of
goods for commerce".41 It has been long declared that commerce includes
manufacture,'4 2 so there is no trouble in applying the Act to employees of a
manufacturer who sells directly into interstate commerce.' 3  Some difficulty,
34. 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
35. Moses v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 5 WAGE & HouR REP. 224 (S. D. Tex.
1942) ; Eddings v. Southern Dairies, 42 F. Supp. 664 (E. D. S. C. 1942) ; Veazey Drug
Co. v. Fleming, 42 F. Supp. 689 (W. D. Okla. 1941) ; Fleming v. Goldblatt Bros., 38
F. Supp. 701 (N. D. Ill. 1941); cf. Jax Beer Co. v. Redfern, 124 F. (2d) 172 (C. C. A.
5th, 1940). But cf. Rahgoo v. Cities Service Oil Co., 33 N. Y. S. (2d) 42 (Man. Mun.
Ct. 1942).
36. Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124 F. (2d) go (C. C. A. 5th, i94);
Fleming v. American Stores Co., 42 F. Supp. 511 (E. D. Pa. 194') ; cf. Klotz v. Ippo-
lito, 4o F. Supp. 422 (S. D. Tex. 1941).
37. 38 F. Supp. 94 (N. D. Ga. 1941). But cf. Dauhoff v. Henry Gramling & Co.,
42 F. Supp. 754 (E. D. Ark. f94).
38. Fleming v. Alterman, 38 F. Supp. 94, Ioi (N. D. Ga. 1941).
39. 1 213 (a) (2) exempts employees of a bona fide retail establishment the greater
part of whose business is intrastate commerce.
4o. Fleming v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 7Ol (N. D. Ill. 1941) even went
so far as to say that when goods were shipped from a warehouse in one state to a
warehouse owned by the same employer in another state, the transaction was still purely
"local". Such a decision should not be followed. Cf. Fleming v. Kenton Loose Leaf
Tobacco Warehouse, 41 F. Supp. 255 (E. D. Ky. 1941).
41. §§ 206, 207.
42. See Note (1938) 87 U. oF PA. L. REv. 91, 94. For a discussion of the vast
extension of the commerce power in recent years to manufacturing, see Maier, Federal
Regulation of Manufacturing Under the Interstate Commerce Power (194o) 24 MARQ.
L. REV. 175.
43. The mere fact that a manufacturer bought his materials from another state and
used them in making his product which was then sold locally does not make him sub-
ject to the Act. See Muldowney v. Seaberg Elevator Co., 39 F. Supp. 275, 280 (E. D.
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however, has arisen when goods are produced and then sold to another
company within the state of production without further processing by the
producer, and from there sent to another state. This situation is further
complicated by the provision of the Act making it unlawful to ship, deliver
or sell in commerce with knowledge that shipment, delivery or sale thereof
in commerce is intended, any goods in the production of which any employee
was employed in violation of Section 6 or 7.44 Since Sections 6 and 7,
indicating who is to be subject to the terms of the Act, do not mention the
intent of the employer, it becomes a question of whether the later provision
is to be related back as a qualification to the earlier sections. The Darby
decision includes in production of goods for commerce "goods which, at the
time of production, the employer . . . intends or expects to move in inter-
state commerce". 45 There is a strong implication, however, that the inten-
tion or knowledge of the producer is unimportant.48  Although there has
been only a small amount of litigation on the subject of knowledge and
intent, the few cases that have dealt with them have considered them con-
trolling. If the goods were produced with knowledge that they are intended
to eventually enter interstate commerce, the Act applies to the employer. 47
But if goods produced for local sale and use do enter commerce later the
Act does not apply.48 However, it must be considered that intent is often
difficult to prove, especially [f part of the goods are shipped sporadically in
commerce by customers of the producer. The answer cannot be that the
mere fact that goods produced and sold locally later pass into commerce is
enough to make the production part of such commerce. 49 This would work
too great a hardship on the innocent employer; he might suffer the penalties
of the Act merely through the capriciousness of his customers. The best
solution is to adopt the rule of the reasonable man; if the intended use in
interstate commerce was known or reasonably ought to have been expected
by the employer, then he is engaged in production for commerce,50 and is
subject to the provisions of the Act. Of course, in some cases the fact that
the goods will eventually pass into commerce is so obvious that no proof is
needed and the court can take judicial notice df the fact,5' but if the rule of
N. Y. 1941). The nearest approach to such a holding is the case of a newspaper sell-
ing over 98% of its copies locally, but held to be in commerce because the "instru-
mentalities of commerce are used and affected by every newspaper in gathering and
publishing news . . .". Fleming v. Lowell Sun Co., 36 F. Supp. 320 (D. Mass. X940).
Cf. Moss v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 42 F. Supp. 8o7 (M. D. Ga. I941) ; A. H.
Belo Corp. v. Street, 36 F. Supp. 907 (N. D. Tex. 194i).
44. § 215 (a) (i). Employers violating §§ 6 and 7 are liable to their employees
for the amount of unpaid minimum wages, or unpaid overtime, plus an equal amount as
liquidated damages.
45. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, i18 (1941).
46. The court said that "production for commerce" in the Act "includes at least
production of goods which in the normal course of business were intended to enter
commerce."
47. Enterprise Box Co. v. Carver, 5 WAGE & HOUR REP. 187 (C. C. A. 5th, 194.2);
Fleming v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co., 39 F. Supp. 300 (E. D. Tenn. ig4i);
Sunshine Mining Co. v. Carver, 34 F. Supp. 274 (D. Idaho, 1940).
48. Jewel Tea Co. v. Williams, II8 F. (2d) 202 (C. C. A. ioth, 194); Veazey
Drug Co. v. Fleming, 42 F. Supp. 689 (W. D. Okla. 194) ; Hooks v. Nashville Block
& Tile Co., 39 F. Supp. 369 (M. D. Tenn. 1941); Bagby v. Cleveland Wrecking Co.,
28 F. Supp. 271 (W. D. Ky. 1939) ; cf. Ligon v. United States Gas Pipe Line Co., 4
WAGE & HoUR REP. 422 (N. D. Tex. 1941). But cf. Divine v. Levy, 39 F. Supp. 44
(W. D. La. 194) (intent not discussed).
49. Cf. Fleming v. Hitchcock, 38 F. Supp. 358 (S. D. Fla. I94I).
50. Fleming v. Hitchcock, 38 F. Supp. 358 (S. D. Fla. 194) ; accord: Fleming v.
Rex Oil & Gas Co., 4 WAGE & HoUR REP. 628 (W. D. Mich. 1941).
5i. St. John v. Brown, 38 F. Supp. 385 (N. D. Tex. i94i); cf. Allen v. Moe, 39
F. Supp. 5 (D. Idaho, 1941).
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the reasonable man is followed, the same result will be obtained, and the
rule will remain a workable solution for more difficult cases.
It has been pointed that the FLSA does not extend to an employer
whose work merely affects commerce. However, production of goods for
commerce is defined as "any process or occupation necessary to the produc-
tion" of such goods. 52 If the literal meaning of these words is followed, the
Act is very broad; none the less, it is this literal interpretation that has been
followed almost universally. Here the courts have delved into the hinter-
land of the commerce power, stretching it in many instances almost beyond
recognition. Certainly he who is employed to cut down trees and deliver
them to the mill where they are made into matches by another company is
necessary to the production of the matches for interstate commerce. 53 So
also is the employee who drills an oil well and pulls out bef6Fe oil is hit,
leaving the finishing of the job to others.5 4 Both have been held subject to
the Act. Consider another example. An employer manufactures ice which
is used to cool railroad cars in which products are shipped interstate. Under
a literal interpretation of the Act, his employees are subject to it since they
are "essential and integral parts" 55 of the shipment of goods in commerce.
Since the ice soon melts away an excellent argument can be made that it
has been delivered to the ultimate consumer, and so should not be considered
an occupation subject to the Act. But this argument has been rejected.
Although these activities are essential to the production of goods for com-
merce, they are so far removed from commerce itself as not to be a part of
it; it would seem more reasonable here to abandon the literal interpretation
of the Act and hold the employees not subject to it. Merely because a par-
ticular employee can be brought under the literal terms of the Act, it does
not necessarily follow that he should be covered by it. If a literal applica-
tion leads to a result obviously beyond federal jurisdiction, a restrictive
interpretation should be employed.
Thus far the problem of those workers who actually handle the goods
has been considered. But it is possible to be employed in an occupation
necessary to production without physical contact with the product. A case
in point is that of the watchman. There is no doubt that a watchman is a
cog necessary to the smooth operation of modern business. If it were not
so, he would not be on the payroll. 56 Although it is difficult to see how he
can be classified as a producer in the dictionary meaning of the word,
courts have unhesitatingly held that while watching goods destined for inter-
state commerce, he is a producer under tie definition set forth in the Act."'
Of course if he watches goods which do not enter commerce, he is not sub-
ject to the Act.58 "They also serve who only stand and wait"', may be a
52. § 203 ().
53. Allen v. Moe, 39 F. Supp. 5 (D. Idaho, 1941).
54. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 124 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 5th, 1941).
55. Gordon v. Paducah Ice 0fg. Co., 41 F. Supp. 980, 987 (W. D. Ky. 1941) ; cf.
Fleming v. Atlantic Co., 40 F. Supp. 654 (N. D. Ga. ig4i). But cf. Chapman v. Home
Ice Co., 4 WAGE & HOUR REP. 133 (W. D. Tenn. 1941).
56. INTERP. BULL. No. I, Oct. 12, 1938, (939) I WAGE & HoUR REF. MAN. 72.
57. Fleminig v. Pearson Hardwood Flooring Co., 39 F. Supp. 300 (E. D. Tenn.
1941); Lefevers v. Export Iron & Metal Co., 36 F. Supp. 838 (S. D. Tex. 1940) ; cf.
Flores v. Baetjer, 4 WAGE & HOUR REP. 471 (D. Puerto Rico, 1941). The argument
for including the watchman under the Act becomes somewhat stronger if he performs
other duties in addition to watching. See Wood v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F.
Supp. 40 (W. D. Tenn. 1940 ) ; Reeves v. Howard County Refining Co., 33 F. Supp. 90
(N. D. Tex. 194o).
58. Rogers v. Glazer, 32 F. Supp. g9o (W. D. Mo. 194o); cf. Brown v. Carter
Drilling Co., 38 F. Supp. 489 (S. D. Tex. 1941).
59. Mr. Justice Sewell dissenting in Hart v. Gregory, 16 S. E. (2d) 837, 839 (N.
C. Sup. Ct. 1941).
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rationalization, but it seems that if Congress really intended such an employ-
ment to be subject to the Act, "employee" should have been more broadly
defined so that the watchman does not have to be called a producer in order
that he may come under the protective coverage of the Act.6"
"Production" has been held to embrace another occupation which is at
least questionable. In this situation a landlord leases his building to tenants
who produce goods for commerce. The landlord furnishes watchmen, fire-
men, elevator operators and maintenance men to keep the building in
repair. Of course, it makes no difference that the employer produces
nothing for commerce, since it is the work of the employee that is the deter-
mining factor, and if the broad interpretation of "necessary to production"
is applied, these employees of the landlord are within the terms of the Act.
Two Circuit Court cases have so held,6 ' but fortunately the weight of
authority is the other way.62 If the Act includes such a marginal activity
as operating an elevator, it is broader than the N. L. R. A. for even the
effect of these employees on commerce is remote. The only commerce an
elevator operator could be engaged in is what one judge referred to as
"vertical intrastate commerce". e
If the broad definition of "produced" contained in the Act is accepted
as consistent with the commerce power, few employers are excluded from
government control under it. The employee who pumps water from the
city reservoir for consumption within the city is a producer for interstate
commerce since the interstate businesses which he supplies could nQt func-
tion without water. Fleming v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp.6 4 gave as a reason for
including building firemen in the Act that "Cutters and stitchers cannot
work in a cold or filthy building". 5 Under this reasoning the local clothing
manufacturer who sells only within the state comes under the Act for those
engaged in interstate commerce cannot work without clothes; the local
ashman is subject to the Act for without his work the buildings of the inter-
state businesses would soon fill up with ashes and refuse. Considered in
the light of this decision, it is difficulty to conceive of an occupation that is
not in some way necessary to the production of goods for commerce. The
necessity of drawing a line somewhere is apparent. Exactly where it lies is
impossible of strict definition, but a helpful approach to the problem is
contained in Robinson v. Mass. Mut. Ins. Co.: 66 "In a sense every indi-
vidual whose activity in any way touches or affects the lives of those engaged
in producing goods for interstate commerce contributes to such production,
but we think Congress intended to limit the Act to those who directly con-
tribute to the production of the goods." 67 Under this interpretation of the
Act, the ashman and elevator operator would not be subject to its terms as
6o. Although it can be argued that a watchman should have the benefits of the
Act, it seems unreasonable to call him a producer. To hold that watching a reservoir
used for drinking water by an interstate producer is governed by the commerce power
seems to be-stretching that power beyond reason. See Flores v. Baetjer, 4 WAGE &
HouR REP. 471 (D. Puerto Rico, 194).
61. Fleming v. Arsenal Bldg. Corp., 125 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) ; Flem-
ing v. Kirscbaum Co., 124 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941) ; cf. Snyder v. Casale, Inc.,
5 WAGS & HouR REP. 222 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
62. The authority contra is: Merryfield v. F. M. Hoyt Shoe Corp., 41 F. Supp.
794 (D. N. H. 1941) ; Robinson v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., I58 S. W. (2d)
441 (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 1941) ; Killingbeck v. Garment Center Capitol, Inc., 259 App. Div.
691, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 521 (1940).
63. Fleming v. Arsenal Building Corp., 38 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S. D. N. Y. 1941).
64. 125 F. (2d) 278 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
65. Id. at 279.
66. 158 S. W.(2d) 441 (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 1941).
67. Id. at 443. (Italics added.)
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producers because their contribution to production would be too indirect.
Admittedly the line between "direct" and "indirect" is tenuous. But it is
properly so; a strict rule would often work hardship and often prove inap-
plicable. Each case must stand on its own facts, and the Act must be applied
to them reasonably. To include only those employees who directly con-
tribute to commerce seems both reasonable and workable. It is these
employees whose work would burden commerce if carried on under sub-
standard conditions, not the employees who only remotely affect commerce.
AMOUNT OF WORK IN COMMERCE
As has been stated, if an employee works exclusively on intrastate
products, although his employer ships most of his products interstate, that
employee is not subject to the Act. 68 Now we are confronted with a situa-
tion in which the employer ships part of his goods interstate and part intra-
state, the employee working on all the goods. How much of the goods must
be shipped interstate for the Act to apply? This is one of the few situations
where the work of the employer becomes of importance, for it must first be
decided whether he is engaged in commerce, and then the employee is either
included in or excluded from the Act. Decisions employ broad terms such
as "substantial" and "incidental" which are of little aid in arriving at a
solution of specific problems. The Darby decision used general language
throughout and was equally general in discussing this question. The Court
said, "Congress . . . has made no distinction as to the volume or amount
of shipments in the commerce or production of goods for commerce by any
particular shipper or producer".6 9 Perhaps this language can be taken to
mean that if any part of a business is interstate, even though a relatively
small proportion, all of that business is subject to federal jurisdiction under
the Act. Although the general rule is that applicability of the Act does not
depend on the amount of interstate business,70 it cannot be said that the
percentage of interstate business is never of importance. If the percentage
of interstate business is very small in relation to the total business, the doc-
trine of de minimis ion curat lex applies,7 - but when this doctrine controls
has not been made clear. Thus, % of I % has been held substantial enough
to bring employees of the business within the Act,7 2 as has 1 %,7' but these
seem to be in defiance of the de minimis doctrine. Some courts have based
their decisions on whether the interstate part of the business is substantial
enough to be more than merely incidental to the main business of the par-
ticular employer. 74 Fortunately, in most cases the answer should be appar-
68. See note 27 supra.
6g. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 123 (194I).
70. Pruett v. Carruthers & Son Lumber Co., Inc., 4 WAGE & HouR REP. 192
(Tenn. 1942); Cooper v. Gas Corp. of Michigan, 4 Lab. Cas. 6o,686 (C. C. Mich.
1941) ; Stucker v. Roselle, 37 F. Supp. 864 (W. D. Ky. 194).
71. Goldberg v. Worman, 37 F. Supp. 778 (S. D. Fla. x941). In Cooper v. Gas
Corp. of Michigan, 4 LAB. CAs. 60,686 (C. C. Mich. 1941) the interstate products were
merely by-products and a very small part of the total business; the employee was en-
gaged directly with these by-products. Under the reasoning of the Goldberg case, this
would not be sufficient to bring other employees of the plant under the Act, which seems
to be the correct result, although not reached by the Cooper case.
72. Muldowney v. Seaberg Elevator Co., 39 F. Supp. 275 (E. D. N. Y. 1941).
73. Nelson v. Southern Ice Co., 4 LAB. CAs. 60,710 (N. D. Tex. 194), in which
the employee, held subject to the Act, spent only part of his time engaged in this small
interstate portion of the business. Contra: Morrow v. Lee Baking Co., 4 LAB. CAS.
60,701 (N. D. Ga. 194).
74. Goldberg v. Worman, 37 F. Supp. 778 (S. D. 'Fla. 1941); Wood v. Central
Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. Supp. 4o (W. D. Tenn. 194o); Yunker v. Abbye Employ-
ment Agency, Inc., 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 715 (Mun. Ct. Brooklyn, 1941) ; cf. Prescription
House, Inc. v. Anderson, 42 F. Supp. 874 (S. D. Tex. 1941).
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ent from the facts. For instance in Hooks v. Nashville Block & Tile Co.7 5
98%% of the employer's blocks were sold locally. The court held him not
subject to the provisions of the Act, terming the interstate transactions
small and isolated. A workable rule would be to ascertain the volume pro-
duced for interstate commerce, then whether these transactions in commerce
are a part of the regular business, after which it is a matter for judicial
discretion to determine if the volume is sufficiently large to burden com-
merce.
Another problem is the employee who spends part of his time in inter-
state commerce and the rest in intrastate commerce. It has been held that
the employee must point out how much time was spent in each, and may
recover only for that time actually spent in interstate commerce work.7 6
Other courts have held that the employee comes under the FLSA during
.11 the time spent in both interstate and intrastate work.7 7  If the former
rule is followed, it will open the way for evasion of the Act by employers
seeking to avoid the overtime provision. The employee could be allowed
to spend forty hours on interstate commerce work, and the remainder of
the week on exclusively intrastate commerce work, during which time he
would not be allowed to recover the overtime wage. The latter rule would
seem to unduly burden the employer. The solution is in the nature of a
compromise. If the employee does both types of work during the same
week, he should be paid according to the Act for all the work.7 8 But if he
works in commerce during one week and not in commerce during the next,
his work is so segregated that it is easily possible to pay him corresponding
wages. Thus the intent of Congress is made effective, and the possibility
of evasion is eliminated.
CONCLUSION
From the mass of conflicting decisions and interpretations concerning
the FLSA it is difficult to formulate any accurate rules for its application.
In some instances the courts have seemed loath to apply its provisions
where logically they should apply. These conservative decisions probably
result from a fear of invading states' rights, 79 of interfering with matters of
purely local jurisdiction. In other instances the courts have stretched the
terms of the Act to cover situations which seem clearly outside its scope,
doubtless feeling that the benefits of the Act should be extended to as many
employees as possible. The proper application lies in an area somewhere
between these two extremes. The identification of this area depends on a
proper use of the commerce power, and it must be remembered that, in
spite of the vast extension of this power in recent years, it cannot be used
at all unless commerce is actually involved. What is commerce under the
Act? This is the basic conflict.
75. 39 F. Supp. 369 (M. D. Tenn. 1941) ; accord: Gerdert v. Certified Poultry &
Egg Co., 38 F. Supp. 964 (S. D. Fla. 1941).
76. Super-Cold Southwest Co. v. McBride, 124 F. (2d) go (C. C. A. 5th, 1941);
Corbett v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp., 5 WAGE & Houl R-. 219 (S. D. Tex.
1942) ; Klotz v. Ippolito, 4o F. Supp. 422 (S. D. Tex. 1941).
77. Fleming v. Knox, 42 F. Supp. 948 (S. D. Ga. 1941); cf. Lewis v. Nailling, 36
F. Supp. 187 (W. D. Tenn. 194o).
78. See Cooper, loc. cft. supra note 13, at 342.
79. It must be remembered throughout discussion of the Act, that the limit of the
commerce power is that area of regulation reserved to the states. It is significant to
note that no state has as yet complained of an invasion of its rights by decisions under
the FLSA. Doubtless states are only too glad to be saved the expense incident to the
administration of a wage and hour law. This conflict may arise later when states pass
their own regulatory statutes, but can be avoided if the state regulations are made to
closely correspond to the provisions of the FLSA.
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It has been suggested that an employee cannot be subject to the Act
unless he is so closely related to commerce as to be really a part of it. This
is typical of the vague terminology that the 'courts have used, but, unfor-
tunately, no more definite rules can be laid down. The Act pertains to a
broad field of federal regulation in which judicial discretion must be given
free rein. Each case must stand on its own facts and the courts can only
be cautioned to apply the Act reasonably, keeping always in mind its pur-
poses and the limitations on the commerce power.
The most unfortunate results have been obtained by overextending the
Act's provisions. This seems especially undesirable when viewed in the
light of practical fact. It is not the large interstate industries that pay low
wages and have long working hours; the worst working conditions prevail
in the local sweatshops, and these cannot be reached by the Act. Without
amendment, the Federal Government cannot constitutionally regulate the
wages and hours of the purely local workingman. This means the only
possible method of regulating them will be by state legislation. It therefore
seems useless to stretch the terms of the Act to cover those marginal situ-
ations on or beyond the "lunatic fringe" of interstate commerce. Let these,
like the sweatshop, wait for local legislation, and preserve federal jurisdic-
tion for those activities clearly covered by the provisions of the Constitution.
1. N. S.
